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Worry has traditionally been considered in the study of common emotional disorders such as anxiety
and depression, but recent studies indicate that worry may be a causal factor in the occurrence and
persistence of persecutory delusions. The effect of worry on processes traditionally associated with
psychosis has not been tested. The aim of the study was to examine the short-term effects of a bout of
worry on three cognitive processes typically considered markers of psychosis: working memory, jumping
to conclusions, and anomalous internal experience. Sixty-seven patients with persecutory delusions in
the context of a non-affective psychotic disorder were randomised to a worry induction, a worry
reduction, or a neutral control condition. They completed tests of the cognitive processes before and after
the randomisation condition. The worry induction procedure led to a signiﬁcant increase in worry. The
induction of worry did not affect working memory or jumping to conclusions, but it did increase a range
of mild anomalous experiences including feelings of unreality, perceptual alterations, and temporal
disintegration. Worry did not affect the occurrence of hallucinations. The study shows that a period of
worry causes a range of subtle odd perceptual disturbances that are known to increase the likelihood of
delusions. It demonstrates an interaction between affective and psychotic processes in patients with
delusions.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Worry is conventionally studied within the anxiety disorders,
but it has recently been given prominence in a theoretical account
of persecutory delusions (Freeman, 2007). Worry brings more
implausible paranoid ideas to mind, keeps them there, and esca-
lates the distress. There is increasing evidence to support this view.
In a national epidemiological survey, individuals reporting con-
cerns of plots to harm them had almost ten times higher odds of
reporting worry than individuals without paranoid fears (Freeman
et al., 2011). Cross-sectional studies with patients with persecutory
delusions have shown that high levels of worry are common,
comparable to those seen in generalised anxiety disorder, and thates to Psychosis, Department
al, Oxford OX4 7JX, UK.
. Freeman).
 license.higher levels of worry are associated with more distressing para-
noia (Freeman and Garety, 1999; Freeman et al., 2001; Startup et al.,
2007;Morrison andWells, 2007; Bassett et al., 2009; Freeman et al.,
2010). Worry is not simply a consequence of paranoid thoughts
however. Longitudinal studies have shown that worry predicts the
later development and persistence of paranoid fears (Startup et al.,
2007; Freeman et al., 2012b), and an experimental study has shown
that higher levels of worry predict the occurrence of paranoid
thoughts (Freeman et al., 2008). In the strongest tests of the causal
role of worry in persecutory delusions, two clinical intervention
studies have shown that directly targeting the cognitive style of
worry signiﬁcantly lessens paranoia (Foster et al., 2010; Hepworth
et al., 2011). This series of studies indicates that worry in psychosis
may well require the level of attention it receives in the anxiety
disorders.
Theoretical accounts of psychosis increasingly highlight both
affective and cognitive routes to delusions (e.g. Garety et al., 2001;
Myin-Germeys et al., 2003; Bentall et al., 2009). This is notmeant to
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distinction between what have traditionally been considered as
emotional and psychotic processes. Non-affective cognitive
disturbance in psychosis has had the greater focus (e.g. Hemsley,
1993; Frith, 1992; Kapur, 2003; Green et al., 2004), but the
emotional route to delusions is gaining evidential support (e.g.
Lincoln et al., 2010b; Ben-Zeev et al., 2011; Thewissen et al., 2011).
The study of worry in psychosis is an example of the latter affective
route, since worry is traditionally considered central to the expe-
rience of anxiety problems and it is not listed in descriptions of
psychosis, but is there an impact of worry on cognitive processes
traditionally associated with psychosis? Is there an interaction
between emotional and psychotic processes? To answer this
question we examined the immediate effects of a bout of worrying
on three processes studied in psychosis: working memory, jumping
to conclusions, and perceptual anomalies. Meta-analyses have
consistently shown that working memory performance is impaired
in individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (e.g. Lee and Park,
2005; Forbes et al., 2009), leading to the view that it may be an
endophenotype for the diagnosis (e.g. Horan et al., 2008). Jumping
to conclusions, a tendency to seek less data before reaching a de-
cision, has been speciﬁcally linked with delusional beliefs, and it
has been reliably found in patients with psychosis (see Garety et al.,
2007; Freeman, 2007; Fine et al., 2007). Particular cognitive dys-
functions in psychosis are considered to produce anomalies of
experience (such as perceptual and attentional disturbances,
altered experience of self, aberrant salience) that lead to delusional
misinterpretations (e.g. Maher, 1988; Kapur, 2003; Uhlhaas and
Mishara, 2007); the presence of such anomalies have been
repeatedly found in patients with psychosis (e.g. Chapman, 1966;
Phillipson and Harris, 1985; Bunney et al., 1999; Parnas et al.,
2003) and to be associated with delusional ideation (e.g. Bell
et al., 2006; Freeman et al., 2008, 2010). We therefore studied
worry in relation to three processes commonly considered impor-
tant cognitive markers of psychosis.
Study of a bout of worry in patients with psychosis has not been
reported before. However, a bout of worry in non-clinical worriers
has been found to be associatedwith a reduction inworkingmemory
capacity (Hayes et al., 2008; Leigh and Hirsch, 2011), and an anxious
mood induction has been found to increase the jumping to conclu-
sions bias in a non-clinical sample (Lincoln et al., 2010a), although
not in a delusions group (So et al., 2008). Whether a mood induction
increases perceptual anomalies is unknown, but levels of anxiety
positively correlate with the presence of perceptual distortions (e.g.
Bell et al., 2011; Tone et al., 2011). In the current study it was hy-
pothesized that psychotic processes would be exacerbated when
patients engage in a period of worry: that worry makes it harder to
process information and reason and that it creates a more subjec-
tively odd state. It was predicted that a decrease inworkingmemory,
an exacerbation of the jumping to conclusions reasoning style, and
the occurrence of anomalous experiences would be greatest in a
worry induction group and least in a worry reduction condition. In
order to enhance the clinical relevance of the study, we chose to
study a bout of worry in patients with persecutory delusions in
which worry was identiﬁed as at a high level; the effects of worry
were studied in those who were prone to adopt this cognitive style.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
67 patients with persecutory delusions completed the study
during the baseline assessment, prior to randomisation, of a clinical
trial (ISRCTN23197625) (Freeman et al., 2012a). The participants
were recruited from two mental health NHS Trusts: Oxford HealthNHS Foundation Trust, Southern Health NHS Foundation Trust. The
inclusion criteria were: a current persecutory delusion as deﬁned by
Freeman and Garety (2000); scoring at least 3 on the conviction scale
of the PSYRATS delusions scale (i.e. at least 50% conviction in the
delusion) (Haddock et al., 1999); that the delusion had persisted for
at least three months; a clinical diagnosis of schizophrenia, schizo-
affective disorder or delusional disorder; a clinically signiﬁcant level
of worry, as indicated by scores above 44 on the Penn State Worry
Questionnaire (see Startup and Erickson, 2006); aged between 18
and 65; and no changes to medication in the past month. Criteria for
exclusion were: a primary diagnosis of alcohol or substance de-
pendency or personality disorder; organic syndrome or learning
disability; a command of spoken English inadequate for engaging in
therapy; and currently having individual CBT.
2.2. Baseline assessments
2.2.1. Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales e delusions (PSYRATS;
Haddock et al., 1999)
The PSYRATS e delusions is a six item multidimensional mea-
sure. It assesses the conviction, preoccupation, distress and
disruption associated with delusions. Symptoms over the last week
are rated. Higher scores indicate greater severity.
2.2.2. Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS; Kay, 1991)
The PANSS is a 30-item rating instrument developed for the
assessment of patients with schizophrenia. Symptoms over the last
week were rated (i.e. currently present). Higher scores indicate the
greater presence of psychiatric symptoms.
2.2.3. Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale (GPTS; Green et al.,
2008)
The GPTS is a thirty-two itemmeasure of paranoid thinking. Part
A assesses ideas of reference (e.g. ‘It was hard to stop thinking about
people talking about me behind my back’) and Part B assesses ideas
of persecution (e.g. ‘I was convinced there was a conspiracy against
me’). Each item is rated on a 5-point scale. Higher scores indicate
greater levels of paranoid thinking. The scale was completed for the
period of the previous fortnight.
2.2.4. Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Meyer et al., 1990)
The PSWQ is the most established measure of trait worry style
and has been used in non-clinical and clinical populations (see
review by Startup and Erickson, 2006). Each of the sixteen items is
rated on a 5-point scale. Higher scores indicate a greater tendency
to worry.
2.2.5. Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler,
1999)
The WASI is a standardised short and reliable measure of in-
telligence. The Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning subtests were
used to obtain an estimate of IQ.
2.3. Tasks completed before and after the randomisation condition
2.3.1. Visual analogue rating scales (VAS)
In order to test the effects of the three conditions on worry and
mood state, the participants marked on three 0 (‘Not at all’) to 100
(‘totally’) visual analogue scales the degree to which ‘right now’
they felt worried, anxious, or happy.
2.3.2. Working memory: tasks from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale III (WAIS-III) (Wechsler, 1997)
Three working memory tasks were used: digit span forwards,
digit span backwards, and letterenumber sequencing. These are
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2.3.3. Jumping to Conclusions (JTC): the beads task (Garety et al.,
2005)
Data-gathering was assessed with a probabilistic reasoning task
that has been extensively used with people with delusions. Par-
ticipants are asked to request as many pieces of evidence (coloured
beads) as they would like before making a decision (from which of
two hidden jars the beads are drawn). The two jars have beads of
two different colours in opposite ratios. The ratio of beads for the
version used in the current study was 60:40. The colours of the
beads in the jars were altered for the repeat of the task. The key
variable is the number of beads requested beforemaking a decision.
2.3.4. Anomalous experiences I: Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions
Scale (CAPS; Bell et al., 2006)
In the current study the CAPSwas adapted into a statemeasure by
asking whether any of the perceptual anomalies had occurred in the
past 5 min, with participants simply responding with a Yes or No. A
higher score represents the reporting of a greater number of
perceptual anomalies. The scale covers a variety of anomalies
including changes in levelsof sensory intensity (e.g. ‘Are soundsmuch
louder than they normally would be?’), distortion of own body or the
external world (e.g. ‘Have you found the appearance of things or
people seeming to change in a puzzling way e.g. distorted shapes or
sizes or colour?’), sensory ﬂooding (e.g. ‘Have you found that sensa-
tions happened all at once and ﬂooded you with information?’),
temporal lobeexperiences (e.g. ‘Haveyouhad the feeling thatof being
uplifted, as if driving or rolling over a roadwhile sitting quietly?’) and
hallucinations (e.g. ‘Have you heard noises or soundswhen therewas
nothing about to explain them?’). In the current study we analysed
the total score, but also tested separately the hallucination items and
the non-hallucination perceptual anomalies.
2.3.5. Anomalous experiences II: Cambridge Depersonalisation
Scale (CDS; Sierra and Berrios, 2000)
We included a second scale to help capture the wide variety in
anomalous experiences. The CDS was based on the view that
‘depersonalisation constitutes a syndrome which, in addition to
ineffable feelings of ‘unreality’, also includes emotional numbing,
heightened self-observation, changes in body experience, distor-
tions in the experiencing of time and space, changes in the feeling of
agency, feelings of having the mind empty of thoughts, memories
and/or images, and an inability to focus and sustain attention’ (Sierra
and Berrios, 2000). Two studies have shown that the scale assesses
ﬁve distinct types of anomalous experiences (Sierra et al., 2005;
Simeon et al., 2008). We used an adapted state version by asking
about the occurrence of such experiences in the past few minutes.
Weused 19 items from the CDS, since ten itemswere not suitable for
a state version (e.g. ‘previously familiar places look unfamiliar, as if I
had never seen them before’). Higher scores indicate greater
occurrence of anomalies. We examined the total score but also used
four factors from the largest study of the CDS structure (Simeon
et al., 2008): unreality of self (e.g. ‘Familiar voices (including my
own) sound remote and unreal’), perceptual alterations (e.g. ‘I have
the feeling thatmyhands ormy feet have become larger or smaller’),
unreality of surroundings (e.g. ‘What I see looks ‘ﬂat’ or ‘lifeless’, as if
I were looking at a picture’), and temporal disintegration (e.g. ‘It
seems as if things that I have done had takenplace a long time ago.’).
2.4. Procedure
The study was approved by an NHS research ethics committee.
Participants completed the baseline assessments and the tasksassessing working memory, jumping to conclusions, and anomalous
experiences. They then either received a worry induction, worry
reduction, or a neutral condition. Randomisation to condition was
carried out using www.randomisation.com. The tasks assessing
psychotic processes were then repeated. The worry induction pro-
cedure was designed to encourage worry about topics that each
participant already spent considerable time thinking about. It con-
sisted of three stages. In the ﬁrst stage the Worry Domains Ques-
tionnaire (WDQ; Tallis et al., 1992) was used to elicit common
worries (that are not paranoid). In the second stage, participants took
their two main worries identiﬁed from the WDQ and completed the
catastrophising procedure for each (Vasey and Borkovec, 1992). The
catastrophising procedure produces a ‘worry chain’ by the experi-
menter repeatedly responding to answers with ‘What is it that
worries you about X?’ Participants were led to produce at least ten
catastrophising steps for each worry. The third stage was 5 min of
further engagement with worry, using instructions fromMcLaughlin
et al. (2007): “During this periodwewould like you to engage with your
worrisome thoughts. Please refer to your list of worrisome topics. When
you are asked to begin, please close your eyes and worry about your
most worrisome topic in the way that you usually worry about it, but as
intensely as you can, until the experimenter asks you to stop and open
your eyes. If you normally worry about one topic at a time, please try to
do the same during this period. However, if your thoughts change to
another worry topic during this period feel free to allow these thoughts
to continue. It is alright to change topics during this period if the changes
occur naturally during the worry process.” We have previously shown
in non-clinical individuals that worry is increased using this proce-
dure (Southgate, 2009). The worry reduction procedure consisted of
a 10 min mindfulness relaxation exercise (‘Mindfulness of the
breath’) (Kabat-Zinn, 2006), which could be accompanied by positive
music if the participant chose (Delibes: Coppélia Act 1 Number 3
Mazurka) (Mayer et al., 1995). The neutral condition consisted of the
person simply reading from a selection of magazines for tenminutes.
Participants who received the worry induction condition also
received if they wished the worry reduction condition at the end of
testing.
2.5. Analysis
All analyses were carried out using SPSS Version 20 (IBM, 2011).
To test change after the randomisation condition, analysis of
covariance was used, with post-randomisation score as the
dependent variable, group as a ﬁxed factor, and baseline score as
the covariate. When there was a main effect of group, least signif-
icant difference pairwise comparisons for the estimated marginal
means were tested. All hypothesis testing was two-tailed.
3. Results
3.1. Demographic and clinical information
Basic demographic and clinical information for each of the
randomisation groups is presented in Table 1. The participants
predominately had clinical diagnoses of schizophrenia, were un-
employed, and were prescribed anti-psychotic medication. They
had levels of paranoia as assessed by the GPTS comparable to other
studies of patients with persecutory delusions (e.g. Freeman et al.,
2010) and levels of worry as assessed by the PSWQ comparable to
patients with generalised anxiety disorder (e.g. Behar et al., 2003).
3.2. The effects of the randomisation conditions
It can be seen in Table 2 that the worry induction condition
signiﬁcantly increased levels of worry comparedwith the other two
Table 1
Basic demographic and clinical information.
Worry induction
(n ¼ 20)
Neutral condition
(n ¼ 22)
Worry reduction
(n ¼ 25)
Mean age in years (SD) 39.9 (12.2) 42.2 (11.6) 43.5 (11.3)
Sex:
Male 11 13 12
Female 9 9 13
Ethnicity:
White 19 20 24
Black Caribbean 0 0 1
Black African 0 0 0
Black Other 0 0 0
Indian 0 1 0
Pakistani 0 0 0
Other 1 1 0
Unemployed 15 14 15
Mean IQ (SD) 104.8 (17.6) 96.2 (19.4) 103.9 (17.3)
Diagnosis:
Schizophrenia 17 16 15
Schizo-affective disorder 1 1 3
Delusional disorder 1 3 4
Psychosis NOS 1 3 3
Medication (Chlorpromazine equiv.):
None 1 1 2
Low (1e200 mg) 2 5 5
Medium (200e400 mg) 4 7 10
High (400 mg) 13 9 8
Mean number of admissions in past 5 years (SD) 0.8 (1.3) 0.5 (0.7) 0.5 (1.0)
Mean PSYRATS delusions score (SD) 19.5 (1.8) 19.2 (2.7) 18.3 (3.0)
Mean PSYRATS delusions conviction (SD) 3.5 (0.5) 3.6 (0.5) 3.3 (0.7)
Mean PANSS score (SD) 84.6 (11.8) 82.4 (14.8) 77.5 (15.4)
Mean GPTS e Part A score (SD) 53.7 (14.3) 54.6 (14.7) 51.7 (16.8)
Mean GPTS e Part B score (SD) 61.1 (12.6) 58.9 (16.1) 54.8 (18.9)
Mean PSWQ score (SD) 66.1 (10.1) 66.1 (14.6) 64.9 (9.0)
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Theworry induction condition also produced an increase in anxiety
and a decrease in happiness compared with the other two condi-
tions. The worry reduction condition did not signiﬁcantly alter
levels of anxiety or happiness.3.3. Effects on psychotic processes
The post-randomisation performance of each group on the tasks
assessing psychotic processes is summarized in Table 3. It can be
seen that there are no differences between the groups in perfor-
mance on working memory or jumping to conclusions tasks (con-
trolling for baseline scores). However there are increases in the
occurrence of anomalies of experience in the worry induction
condition compared with the other two conditions. The only
exception for anomalous experiences is that the occurrence of
hallucinations is not affected by randomisation condition. (TheTable 2
Estimated post-randomisation scores on the VAS scales (adjusted for baseline
scores).
Worry
induction
(n ¼ 20)
Neutral
condition
(n ¼ 22)
Worry
reduction
(n ¼ 25)
Test of group
effect
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE F (2, 65) p-Value
Worry 67.2a 4.3 44.2b 4.1 31.6c 3.8 19.5 <.001
Anxiety 65.8a 4.0 41.5b 3.8 34.1b 3.6 18.5 <.001
Happiness 29.2a 3.9 46.0b 3.8 45.5b 3.6 6.1 .004
Signiﬁcant group differences (p < .05) are denoted by differing superscript letters.same signiﬁcant effects are found if PANSS total score is added as a
covariate.)
4. Discussion
Patients with persecutory delusions who worried were the
focus of this study. Previous research has shown that this is the
most common presentation of paranoia (e.g. Freeman and Garety,
1999; Morrison and Wells, 2007; Freeman et al., 2010). We exam-
ined the effects of a bout of worry in these individuals on processes
customarily considered as markers of psychosis. Given that worry
was known to occur frequently in these patients we wanted to
knowwhether it impacted on psychotic processes. The results were
very clear. The occurrence of worry did not affect working memory
or jumping to conclusions, but it did lead to an increase in a range of
low-level anomalous experiences. Increases in sensations of the
unreality of self and surroundings (e.g. feeling of being a detached
observer), perceptual alterations (e.g. body feeling very light as it if
were ﬂoating), and temporal disintegration (e.g. seeming as if
things done recently had taken place a long time ago) were all more
likely to occur after a period of worry. Worrying less reduced the
occurrence of anomalies of sensory intensity (e.g. lights or colours
seeming brighter or more intense than usual) and sensory ﬂooding
(e.g. difﬁculty distinguishing one sensation from another). Our
assessment covered awide variety of anomalous experiences and it
was only the occurrence of hallucinations that was unaffected. The
point of interest learned from the experiment is that a period of
worry in these patients was creating a range of potentially
confusing and puzzling perceptual experiences that are known to
predict paranoid thoughts.Worrywas causing odd subjective states
that are known to lead to odd ideas. This is an illustration of an
Table 3
Estimated post-randomisation scores on the psychotic processes (adjusted for baseline scores).
Worry induction
(n ¼ 20)
Neutral condition
(n ¼ 22)
Worry reduction
(n ¼ 25)
Test of group effect
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE F (2, 65) p-Value
Working memory
Forward digit span 9.0 0.5 9.6 0.5 9.6 0.4 0.5 .618
Backward digit span 6.2 0.4 5.8 0.3 5.8 0.3 0.5 .637
Letter-number 8.2 0.4 8.7 0.4 8.4 0.3 0.6 .563
Jumping to conclusions
Number of beads 6.4 0.6 6.5 0.6 7.8 0.6 1.8 .175
Anomalous experiences
CAPS 4.7 0.5 4.3 0.5 3.3 0.5 2.3 .107
Hallucinations 1.2 0.2 1.1 0.2 1.3 0.2 0.3 .777
Non-hallucination anomalies 2.2a 0.3 1.9a 0.3 0.9b 0.3 5.5 .006
CDS 5.0a 0.5 2.5b 0.5 2.4b 0.4 10.0 <.001
Unreality 1.7a 0.2 1.1a,b 0.2 0.7b 0.2 4.8 .012
Perceptual 0.9a 0.1 0.4b 0.1 0.2b 0.1 6.3 .003
Surroundings 0.5a 0.1 0.2b 0.1 0.2b 0.1 3.8 .028
Temporal 1.1a 0.1 0.6b 0.1 0.5b 0.1 4.5 .015
Signiﬁcant group differences (p < .05) are denoted by differing superscript letters.
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understanding of how worry may contribute to delusional experi-
ence. This information can be incorporated into the emerging
therapies that target worry in psychosis (Foster et al., 2010;
Hepworth et al., 2011); clinicians can assess for and normalise the
occurrence of such anomalies after a period of worry in patients
with persecutory delusions.
Working memory and jumping to conclusions were not altered
by a period of worry. This fails to replicate the ﬁnding of worry
impeding working memory in high non-clinical worriers (e.g. Leigh
and Hirsch, 2011). However these previous studies assessed working
memory and worry concurrently, while in the current study we
simply assessed the effects after a period of encouraging worry. We
do not know the extent to which individuals in the worry induction
condition were continuing to worry, which is a limitation of the
study. It is also clear that the worry induction was having effects
more generally on mood; this is to be expected but limits the pre-
cision with which the occurrence of anomalous experiences can be
attributed speciﬁcally to worry. Previous studies have had mixed
ﬁndings on jumping to conclusions when manipulating levels of
anxiety (So et al., 2008; Lincoln et al., 2010a), and the current study
does not support the idea that JTC changes with anxious mood state.
We examined three key processes and did not alter signiﬁcance
levels for multiple testing, agreeing with the view that ‘simply
describing what tests of signiﬁcance have been performed, and why,
is generally the best method of dealing with multiple comparisons’
(Perneger, 1998). The ﬁnal key limitation is that we did not assess
levels of paranoia before and after each randomisation condition
which means that we could not test whether and how paranoia
increased after worrying; we simply tested the effects of worry on
psychotic processes, and a larger experimental study that can
examine mediation is now warranted (Emsley et al., 2010). Our
contention is that the role of worry will receive increasing attention
in the study and treatment of delusions.Role of the funding source
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